

Shah, through the period of Mohammad Mossadeq's oil nationalization drive (1951–53), and only faded with the consolidation of the state around Mohammad Reza Shah in the 1960s. An "age of extremes" then took hold via ideological confrontations that, in tandem, portrayed the previous generation's civic push as externally imposed. In Hobsbawm's terminology, ethnic or exclusionary nationalism won the day, guised in Marxist, monarchist, and Islamist packages. Conspiracy theory replaced historical self-awareness, and charismatic populism replaced state building. In this sense, the latter Shah's oil-fueled merging of state, nation, and chauvinist messianism onto a single person was not trumped by the postrevolutionary Khomeini order, but mirrored in it. An intelligentsia that once harnessed mythology to foster pluralism became enslaved to myths that monopolized a worldview at society's expense. This persisted until the end of the 1980s Iran-Iraq war, when a segment of a new revolutionary intelligentsia began to agitate for the fulfillment of constitutional promises long delayed.

Ansari's final chapter on the Islamic Republic delineates an "age of contestation" between Iran's "reformist" intellectuals and their conservative adversaries. During the Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad presidency, the latter forces wielded nationalism as a bludgeon, but "technological changes" had finally decentralized control over the "definition and articulation of nationalism and national identity" (p. 247). State-society relations thus transformed, the Whiggish hopes of Iran's enlightenment nationalists are still possible.

Building from recent scholarship largely unknown to social scientists, the book's sections on early twentieth-century state and nation building are valuable. From a comparative angle, there are striking similarities with other postcolonial projects in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Iranian historiography is belatedly going through a deconstruction moment, and the country is less exceptional than its nationalist scribes and journalist interpreters would have us believe. Yet as Anthony Marx argues (*Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism*, 2003), the distinction between civic/inclusionary and ethnic/exclusionary nationalism may itself be a product of nationalist mythology on the enlightened origins of Western European states, not a trajectory missed by the postcolonial world. More importantly, for a book that decries the simplified trappings of popular politics (which Ansari labels "demotic") and the ease with which charismatic power slides into place, there is no material on anyone other than the elites themselves. This may be warranted for a study of nationalism, but its claims cannot be assessed without accompanying social analysis concerning how these narratives were utilized, rejected, or adapted from below. Charismatic authority is not a causal explanation of political outcomes; this overused concept has long been modernization theory's sloppy

placeholder for describing Third World countries "stuck in transition." A few sentences on educational expansion and demographic change can be found, but even while it critiques officialdom, to borrow from James Scott, this study still sees like a state.

The social—not political—ramifications of the 1979 revolution (or any other mass event) remain off page in this tragic tone poem. Iran's 2009 postelection Green protests, for instance, witnessed young individuals forcefully wielding national myths to scorn the actually existing Islamic Republic and its revolutionary narcissism. The 2013 election exhibited a surprising solidarity between oppositional elites and popular mobilization under a porous nationalism to elect Hassan Rouhani and break up a conservative political monopoly. Future scholarship should weave these actors into the story. Nevertheless, Ansari's contribution has set the stage for thinking through historical change in Iran more robustly than the dominant narratives invented, and then deployed, by nationalists themselves.

Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa: Business Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns. By Leonardo R. Arriola.

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— Lauren M. MacLean, *Indiana University*

Multiethnic coalitions are critical for democracy in Africa. Even after two and a half decades of political reform, many African regimes remain weak democracies where incumbents resist sharing power, or even stubbornly refuse to leave office. Indeed, since 2011, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation has been unable to identify a former head of state who merits the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership. In the context of semiauthoritarian rule, the opposition must be strong; in particular, opposition parties must be able to unify across a host of ethnic and regional differences. Yet in many African countries, the opposition has been fragmented and unable to overturn incumbent regimes. Whereas Mwai Kibaki was able to create a multiethnic coalition to win the 2002 election in Kenya, the opposition remained fragmented and unsuccessful in Cameroon.

Leonardo Arriola's book explores this important topic, asking: Why do multiethnic coalitions form in some countries and not others? In Chapter 2, Arriola lays out his theory of pecuniary coalition formation. He argues that opposition political elites are able to form multiethnic opposition coalitions in countries where neoliberal economic reforms have allowed the emergence of private business elites who have autonomy from the incumbent regime. The key juncture was therefore an incumbent's response to external pressures to liberalize the economy during the 1980s and 1990s. Where incumbents liberalized

financial controls, business elites are able to finance the opposition, and opposition formateurs buy endorsements from other ethnic group leaders, which strengthens and unifies the opposition coalition. Where incumbents maintained financial restrictions, business entrepreneurs are less able to donate to opposition candidates, and the opposition fragments.

Arriola's book is an outstanding example of the way in which thoughtful research design and careful multi-method analysis can yield rich theoretical insights to our understanding of politics. The author begins by laying out the puzzle of opposition coordination, introducing how this has varied over time and across particular key cases in Africa. Each chapter incorporates multimethod analysis, beginning with a large-*n* statistical analysis, followed by qualitative analysis of historical and interview evidence from the two primary case studies, Kenya and Cameroon. (Limited case material from Senegal and Ethiopia is also incorporated at points.)

After developing his theoretical framework, Arriola uses each subsequent chapter to test specific hypotheses and explore the mechanisms for each link in the theorized causal chain. In Chapter 3, the author investigates the historical origins of the state's relationship to domestic capital. He examines how features of the late colonial period shaped attempts by postindependence leaders to mediate access to financial capital through financial reprisal regimes. In Chapter 4, Arriola shows how African leaders were not equally threatened by private capital accumulation at independence. The leaders thus created different kinds of financial systems, depending on whether their constituents or those of rivals would benefit. In this chapter, he tests whether the incumbent had an exporter or whether non-exporter constituency shaped the average number of commercial banks between 1945 and 2000. Next, in Chapter 5, the author investigates why African leaders liberalized their financial systems beginning in the 1980s by analyzing structural adjustment compliance (and not just official adoption), as well as private credit provision. In Chapters 6 and 7, he explains the alignment of business elites vis-à-vis the incumbent regime and opposition formateurs.

Notably, several of the key variables for the quantitative analysis across all African cases are hidden and difficult to observe, for example, the size of a leader's patronage coalition. Arriola is explicit in conceptualizing these terms and is creative in his use of proxies. Hence, building on Nicolas Van de Walle (*African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999*, 2001), he employs the number of cabinet ministers to measure the size of a particular leader's patronage coalition in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, since campaign contributions to opposition candidates are not public information, Arriola uses an indirect measure of business–state relationships by employing the tenure of the president of the national chamber of commerce.

Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa deftly bridges theories of political economy, voting, and ethnic politics. While these literatures are frequently developed in isolation from one another in political science, Arriola demonstrates how the intersection among these three areas of scholarship is critical for understanding the dynamics of election campaigns in Africa. Plenty of work has focused on the extent of ethnic voting across Africa; it is the addition of the political economy lens that adds real originality and value to Arriola's book. Yet one potential problem with attempting to engage with several literatures may be the challenge of developing all of the core theoretical constructs equally well. Even though ethnicity is obviously at the center of his study, the author does not spend much time conceptualizing this variable. His theory is predicated on a highly instrumental view of ethnicity, where ethnic ties are used strategically, but this set of assumptions is not explicitly acknowledged or developed.

The book's theoretical framework is implicitly based on a notion of politics as strategic bargaining among elites. This conceptualization usefully reveals the points of conflict and coalition among political and business elites. But it is also important to ask what this concentration on elite decision making may obscure. Arriola's portrayal of the impacts of neoliberalism is tightly focused on the liberalization of financial controls for business elites, and their access to capital vis-à-vis the state. The focus is a two-player game between business elites and the state, leaving open some questions about a more complex political economy with multinational investors, rapidly accelerating flows of global capital, and heterogeneous effects for various groups of winners and losers at the local level.

Finally, Arriola says little about the implications of his analysis for the future of democracy in Africa. Bargaining and payoffs between business and party elites may facilitate a multiethnic opposition among elites, but is this the end goal? While this book makes a valuable contribution in illuminating the informal exchanges behind closed doors, we know less about the linkages between these elite leaders and the citizens of the polity. If wealthier business men in Kenya dominate politics and have disproportionate access to representation in these political systems, perhaps these nascent democracies are closer to the oligarchic politics of the United States than to the "ideal" model of democracy that Americans promote around the world.

The Political Geography of Inequality: Regions and

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— Jason Beckfield, *Harvard University*

Pablo Beramendi has contributed a major new argument about how the fiscal structure of a polity relates to its