Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa examines coalition building among politicians who represent different ethnic groups in African countries that adopted democratic constitutions in the 1990s. Many incumbent leaders in African countries keep themselves in power, winning election after election, by deploying state resources to enlist the support of politicians from other ethnic groups. Less evident is how opposition politicians in these same countries can form the multiethnic alliances needed to mount a veritable electoral challenge to entrenched incumbents.
The book attributes the formation of multiethnic opposition coalitions to the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital. It shows that opposition politicians are unlikely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages when incumbents can use their influence over financial institutions, namely, banking and credit, to command the allegiance of business — the main funder of opposition in poor countries.
The book shows that liberalizing financial reforms enable opposition politicians to access the resources needed to build multiethnic coalitions. The argument is developed through chapters that combine cross-national quantitative analyses with case studies of Cameroon (a case of opposition fragmentation along ethnic divisions) and Kenya (a case of opposition coordination across ethnic divisions).
The book attributes the formation of multiethnic opposition coalitions to the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital. It shows that opposition politicians are unlikely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages when incumbents can use their influence over financial institutions, namely, banking and credit, to command the allegiance of business — the main funder of opposition in poor countries.
The book shows that liberalizing financial reforms enable opposition politicians to access the resources needed to build multiethnic coalitions. The argument is developed through chapters that combine cross-national quantitative analyses with case studies of Cameroon (a case of opposition fragmentation along ethnic divisions) and Kenya (a case of opposition coordination across ethnic divisions).
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Table of Contents
1. The Puzzle of Opposition Coordination 2. A Theory of Pecuniary Coalition Formation 3. The Emergence of Financial Reprisal Regimes 4. The Political Control of Banking 5. The Liberalization of Capital 6. The Political Alignment of Business 7. Opposition Bargaining across Ethnic Cleavages 8. Multiethnic Opposition Coalitions in African Elections 9. Democratic Consolidation in Africa |
Awards
Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa received the best book award in 2013 from the African Politics Conference Group, an organized section of the American Political Science Association (APSA) and the African Studies Association (ASA). Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa was recognized in 2014 with an honorable mention for the Gregory Luebbert Prize for best book from the Comparative Politics section of the American Political Science Association (APSA). Reviews African Studies Quarterly African Studies Review Australasian Review of African Studies Foreign Affairs International Affairs Journal of Modern African Studies Perspectives on Politics Revue française de science politique |